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injuries sustained in a railway collision for which the hack driver
was largely responsible. 16
From a consideration of the "carriage cases" (and they are truly
representative of all cases where liability is sought to be predicated
upon the giving of directions) it might be said that the decisions are
but declarative of the fact that the hiring of a conveyance and driver
and the indication of destination and route are not tantamount to the
assumption of control over, and responsibility for, the acts of the
servant.'
7
It might be mentioned that to establish the fact that the servant
of one has transferred his services to another pro hac vice, it must
appear that he has assented to such transfer expressly or impiedly.
No one can transfer the services of his servant to another without
the servant's consent. It must appear further that the servant has, in
fact, entered upon the service and submitted himself to the direction
and control of the new master. His assent may be established by
direct proof or by circumstances justifying the inference of such
assent.'8
The true solution of the question of liability for the tortious acts
of a transferred servant would appear to lie in determining which
party had the right to control the servant's acts. In its narrower, or
rather limited sense, control could be determined by the answer to
"Who had the authoritative direction of the servant as to the work
to be done, and how and where to do it?" In its broader sense, the
sense properly applicable in cases of this nature, control should be
determined not only by the answer to the question of authoritative
direction but also by appropriately considering, in connection there-
with, the answers to the complementary questions, "Who hired the
servant; who could properly discharge him; to whom did he look
for wages?"
S. E.
STRIKES AND PICKETING: RIGHT OF LABOR UNION To INDUCE
BREACH OF CONTRAcT-Until the recent decision in the Exchange
"Little v. Hackett, suepra, note 13.
"The rule of the "carriage cases" is applicable to the hiring of an
automobile; Sheppard v. Jacobs, supra, note 9; Wallace v. Keystone Auto
Co., 239 Pa. St. 110, 86 Atl. 699 (1913); Gerretsin v. Rambler Garage Co.,
149 Wisc. 528, 136 N. W. 186 (1912).
" Delaware, etc., Co. v. Hardy, 59 N. J. L. 35, 34 Atl. 986 (1896);
Mo., etc., R. R. Co. v. Ferch, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 46, 44 S. W. 317
(1898).
NOTES AND COMMENT
Bakeries case,1 the question of the legality of picketing without a
strike was attended with great confusion, largely due to varying
judicial conceptions on the subject of picketing generally. From some-
of the decisions of the lower courts it would appear that picketing is
always illegal, this view being predicated upon the assumption that
"peaceful picketing" is wholly visionary, a dream of credulous
optimists, impossible of realization. 2 This attitude of the courts is
rather difficult to understand in the face of clear and unequivocal
decisions by the Court of Appeals that "peaceful picketing" in con-
nection with a strike is legal. 3 The decisions concerning picketing in
the absence of a strike are equally inconsistent. On the one hand,
courts claim that picketing is the legal right of labor unions, re-
gardless of whether or not a strike is in progress. If the picketing be
' Exchange Bakeries v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
This note 'has been limited to the New York adjudications on the
subject.
The New York Court of Appeals, though it has been liberal in its
attitude toward questions involving labor disputes, has quite properly,
recognized its limitations, "A Court of Equity should interfere in labor
disputes, either against the employer or laborer, sparingly and with
caution." Moran v. Lassette, N. Y. L. J., July 20, 1927 (App. Div.,
1st Dept.).
However, the courts have been quick to recognize that the organiza-
tion of labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining performs a
useful social function and is not against public policy, and accordingly
'have granted workers the right to organize for the protection of their
interests; National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315, 63
N. E. 369 (1902); Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897);
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
They have recognized the right to strike for legal objects, i. e., shorter
hours, better pay, and to generally improve their conditions, except where
the strike is actuated by a malicious intention; Manker v. Bakers', Con-
fectioners' & Waiters' Int. Union, 129 Misc. 516, 221 N. Y. Supp. 106
(Sup. Ct., 1927). The courts have also recognized the right to carry
on peaceful boycotts; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582
(1917); Reardon, Inc. v. Caton, et al., 189 App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y.
Supp. 713 (2nd Dept., 1919).
2 hO one occasion a court said, "In cases of this kind, 'peaceful
picketing' or 'mental picketing' or what not, are usually only figures of
speech or exist in the imagination, mostly mentioned, seldom met with.
That there ever in reality existed or was practised 'peaceful picketing'
is a question." Schwartz & Jaffee, Inc. v. Hillman, 115 Misc. 61, 189
N. Y. Supp. 21 (Sup. Ct., 1921). Again, on another occasion, a court
stated "Why peaceful picketing is a good deal of a dream. It can be
done. There are some angels from Heaven who can peacefully picket.
It is more than real human beings can stand. Going up and down and
not doing something more than they ought to do." Leeds Shoe Case Co. v.
Lewis, Special Term of the Supreme Court, N. Y. County, June 24, 1925.
'National Protective Assn. v. Cummings, supra, note 1; Bossert v.
Dhuy, supra, note 1.
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orderly and without violence, no injunction will issue.4 On the other
hand, courts have held that picketing in the absence of a strike is
entirely illegal, even if picketing during the progress of a strike be
not prohibited. The absence of an apparent justification is said by
such ,courts to indicate that the picketing is plainly malicious and
unlawful. 5
The Exchange Bakeries case clarifies the law on this subject to a
large extent. In that case the plaintiff restaurant hired non-union
waitresses upon their promise not to join the union. Subsequently,
without its knowledge, four of the waitresses joined the union. Some
of the defendant union's agents entered the plaintiff's store as
ordinary customers; one of them blew a whistle and called a strike.
The four waitresses who had become members of the union im-
mediately stopped work and left the premises. Thereafter, two of
the women picketed the place by walking up and down in front of
the premises carrying placards announcing the strike. There was no
violence, no intimidation, no collection of crowds. This conduct con-
tinued for four days until it was stopped by a temporary injunction.
The decision of the Court of Appeals reiterates its attitude
toward the subject of picketing generally and gives the workers not
merely a theoretical right of "peaceful picketing" (which some judges
believe to be a myth) in connection with strikes, but holds that
incidental violence in connection with picketing does not bring it
within the category of acts which will be restrained by a court of
equity but that such acts are to be dealt with by the criminal courts.
To entitle the plaintiff to an injunction, it is held the acts must be
repeated and characterize the conduct of the strike. The Court, how-
ever, goes further and declares that picketing without a strike is no
more unlawful than a strike without picketing. This result was
reached by applying the principle that collective bargaining can only
'W. A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc.
185, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct., 1921). Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y.
Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1891). Public Baking Co. v. Stern, 127 Misc. 229,
215 N. Y. Supp. 537 (Sup. Ct., 1926); Foster v. Retail Clerks Protective
Association, 39 Misc. 49, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860 (Sup. Ct., 1902); N. & R.
Theatre, Inc. v. Basson, 127 Misc. 271, 215 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Sup. Ct.,
1925).
'Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, 110 Misc. 357, 181
N. Y. Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct., 1920); Yates Hotel v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. Supp.
558 (Sup. Ct., 1922); Yablonowitz v. Korn, 205 App. Div. 440, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 769 (1st Dept., 1923); Traub Amusement Co. v. Macker, 215
N. Y., Supp. 397 (Sup. Ct., 1925); Bolivian Panama Hat Co. v. Finkle-
stein, 215 N. Y. Supp. 399 (Sup. Ct., 1925); Cushman Sons, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Food Workers, 127 Misc. 152, 215 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup.
Ct., 1925); L. Daitch & Co. v. Cohen, 218 App. Div. 80, 217 N. Y.
Supp. 817 (1st Dept., 1926).
NOTES AND COMMENT
be effective if union conditions prevail not only in the single
establishment, but generally. The rates of wages and working condi-
tions of any one shop affect not only those employed there but also
all others employed in the same industry. Unless the union can
reach all, it cannot possibly attain its ends so that it is of as great
consequence that the union be permitted to picket non-union places in
an endeavor to unionize the workers there as it is that the union be
allowed to call a strike to better the conditions of those who are
already members of its organization. An interesting feature of labor
law discussed in the Exchange Bakeries case involves the question
now before the courts in the pending action of the Interborough
Rapid Transit System against a transit workers' union. Although in
the Exchange Bakeries case the contract between the employees and
the plaintiff was of no definite duration, and therefore the question of
whether or not a union had a right, when not actuated by malice, to
urge the breach of the contract was not involved, nevertheless
Judge Andrews has this to say:
"Even had it been a valid and subsisting contract, however,
it should be noticed, that whatever rule we may finally adopt,
there is yet no precedent in this court for the conclusion that a
union may not persuade its members or others to end contracts
of employment where the final intent lying behind the attempt
is to increase its influence." 6
To support this proposition the court cites several cases which
admittedly represent the law on the general subject. In each of these
cases the defendant persuaded a third party to breach a valid contract
of employment with the plaintiff. Here, however, the similarity be-
tween these cases and the Exchange Bakeries case ends. In Lamb v.
Cheney,7 the relief sought was not an injunction, but damages, and
the court found that the conduct of the defendant was "without just
cause or excuse." In Posner v. Jackson,8 an employee having made
an express contract to perform specific, unique and extraordinary
services for a fixed period was induced to break it by the defendant,
"a rival manufacturer." The situation is obviously different. In Reed
Co. v. Whiteman, 9 there was a finding that the purpose of the union
was purely malicious. In not one of the cases cited were the facts
presented analogous to those of the Exchange Bakeries case nor to
those which are expected to be ultimately presented in the pending
Interborough Rapid Transit suit.
'Exchange Bakeries v. Rifkin, supra, note 1, 266, 267.
'Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920).
'Posner v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573 (1918).
'Reed Co. v. Whiteman, 237 N. Y. 545, 144 N. E. 885 (1924).
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Properly, no authoritative inference can be drawn from the
opinion of Judge Andrews as to the direction in which the decision
will go when there is definitely presented to the Court the question of
the right of a union, for proper purpose, to induce a breach of a
contract of employment. Judicial wisdom will probably not find it
difficult to turn the decision one way or another, depending upon
judicial views of the proper functions and utilities of labor organiza-
tions. While damages are ordinarily awarded to the plaintiff in cases
where the defendant intentionally and knowingly induced the third
party to break his contract with the plaintiff,10 the courts without
further explanation, qualifyingly add the mystic phrase, "without
reasonable justification or excuse,"' leaving what may prove a con-
venient loop-hole.
The application of the I. R. T. for an injunction restraining the
union from attempting to unionize its employees on the ground that
by so doing it is persuading them to breach contracts of employment,
will squarely present to the court the question which we are here
discussing. The I. R. T. has a "company union" of which its em-
ployees are members and the problem before the cburt will ultimately
become a question of social policy, the advisability of permitting the
existence of company unions as against the wisdom of permitting
laboring men to organize themselves into unions uninfluenced by the
employing organization. In this case, what will be "just cause or
excuse" for the labor union's attempted action will probably be but
the asking in another form of the question of whether as a matter
of general policy the courts will permit a labor organization to at-
tempt to destroy a company union and replace it by a union otherwise
organized. The Exchange Bakeries case furnishes ample opportunity
for interesting, though speculative, deductions, not only with regard
to the precise problem of the 1. R. T. suit, but the larger subject of
the extension of labor organization activities generally.
E. N.J. A.R.
THE NEW OHIO CORPORATION ACT.
Early in 1926, a special committee was appointed by the Ohio
Bar Association to revise and modernize the corporation laws of
" Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 459, 141 N. E. 914 (1923); Goodman
Bros., Inc. v. Ashton, 211 App. Div. 769, 208 N. Y. Supp. 83 (lst Dept.,
1925); Hansen v. Humphrey, et al., 218 App. Div. 291, 218 N. Y. Supp.
197 (3rd Dept., 1926); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194
N. Y. Supp. 401 409 (lst Dept., 1922).
"1Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N. Y, Supp. 128
(1st Dept., 1923); Lamb v. Cheney, supra, note 7; Reed Co. v. Whiteman,
supra, note 8; Exchange Bakeries v. Rifkin, supra, note 1, 264.
